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Abstract: The sustainable use of common-pool resources depends on users’ 
behaviour with regards to appropriation and provision. Most knowledge about 
behaviour in such situations comes from experimental research. As experiments 
take place in confined environments, motivational drivers and actions in the field 
might differ. This paper analyses farmers’ use of common property pastures in 
Grindelwald, Switzerland. Binary logistic regression is applied to survey data to 
explore the effect of farmers’ attributes on livestock endowment, appropriation and 
provision behaviour. Furthermore, Q methodology is used to assess the impact of 
broader contextual variables on the sustainability of common property pastures. It 
is shown that the strongest associations exist between (a) socio-economic attributes 
and change in livestock endowment; (b) norms and appropriation behaviour; and 
(c) area and pay-off and provision behaviour. Relevant contextual variables are 
the economic value of the resource units, off-farm income opportunities, and the 
subsidy structure. We conclude that with increasing farm size farmers reduce 
the use and maintenance of common property. Additionally, we postulate that 
readiness to maintain a resource increases with appropriation activities and the 
net returns generated from appropriation.
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1. Introduction
Natural resources like fishing grounds, forests, pastures, and water are often 
managed as common-pool resources. Common-pool resources are jointly 
managed resources, for which individuals’ appropriation diminishes the resource 
stock and potential beneficiaries of which are difficult to exclude (Berkes et al. 
1989). Additionally, most common-pool resources rely on provision activities for 
the supply of resource units and the upkeep of the resource system. Appropriation 
and provision activities comprise social dilemmas, in which users’ short-term 
self-interest stands opposed to the interest of the group, that is to maximise 
appropriation and minimise provision activities (Gardner et al. 1990).
The behaviour of individuals in commons dilemmas affects the sustainability 
of all common-pool resources. Game theory provides the means to simulate 
both appropriation and provision behaviour in laboratory experiments, whereby 
the appropriation problem equals a common-pool resource game. As such, the 
appropriation of users diminishes the resource and hence reduces the stock and pay-
offs of co-players (Keser and Gardner 1999; Cárdenas and Ostrom 2004; Osés-
Eraso and Viladrich-Grau 2007; Ahn et al. 2010; Janssen et al. 2010). The provision 
problem matches a public good game. Public good experiments require players to 
invest in a common stock. The stock changes depending on the investments made 
and with it the individual’s return on the investments (Isaac et al. 1994; Ledyard 
1994; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Gächter and Thöni 2011). Recent attempts to 
validate findings from the laboratory with field experiments underline that users are 
sometimes able to overcome social dilemmas to achieve socially desirable outcomes 
(Cavalcanti et al. 2010; Rustagi et al. 2010; Prediger et al. 2011).
Whilst experiments provide important information about the factors facilitating 
cooperation, they offer limited explanations for the behaviour of real common pool 
resource users, mainly because the material constraints, preferences, and motives 
as they appear in the field are difficult to control for in experiments. This is due to 
the following reasons: Firstly, the underlying assumption of game theory that self-
seeking players behave strictly rational to maximise pay-offs does not reflect reality 
(Smith 2010). Secondly, the behaviour of individuals in experimental settings is 
detached from personal characteristics (Levitt and List 2007; Anderies et al. 2011). 
Thirdly, subjects in laboratory experiments are usually students from Western 
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countries, whose personality traits might differ from those of common-pool resource 
users (Henrich et al. 2010). To complement experimental studies, more information 
is needed about the variables driving the behaviour of real common-pool resource 
users (Janssen and Ahn 2006; Poteete et al. 2010; Anderies et al. 2011). That 
information can then be integrated in experimental design to provide the common 
ground towards a more general behavioural theory of human actions in the use of 
common-pool resources beyond models of pay-off maximising individuals.
In doing so, this study analyses the use of common property pastures in 
Grindelwald, Switzerland. Common property pastures in Switzerland are located at 
higher altitudes, characterized by mountainous terrain. Therefore, they can only be 
used to graze cattle during the summer months. These pastures are typically managed 
and owned by public corporations. The sustainable use of common property pastures 
depends crucially on social-ecological interactions, namely appropriation (grazing 
intensity) and provision (maintenance of the ecological system and the respective 
infrastructure). Since both under- and overgrazing have adverse effects on the 
resource system, for example by reducing biodiversity or pasture productivity, total 
appropriation should remain within a sustainable yield. Furthermore, provision 
activities are needed to maintain or enhance the productivity of the resource system. 
Therefore, the sustainable use of common property pastures is analogous to common 
pool and public goods games, dependent upon the following actions of farmers:
•	 Change in livestock endowment: As livestock provides the means to 
harvest from common property pastures, farmers’ livestock endowment 
determines potential appropriation and provision levels.
•	 Appropriation: The decision whether to send animals to the local common 
property pastures or have them graze in the valley.
•	 Provision: The work or capital farmers invest to maintain common 
property pastures and the related infrastructure.
To better understand the drivers behind individual’s actions and the role of 
contextual variables for the use of common-pool resources, the study aims to 
answer the following questions:
a. What are the overall outcomes for change in livestock endowment, 
appropriation, and provision situations?
b. What are the individual attributes explaining behavioural differences?
c. How do broader contextual variables relate to the use of common property 
pastures?
d. What are the implications for the study of the commons and policy makers?
The paper is structured as follows: Firstly, we introduce the case study region and 
the institutions that influence and structure farmers’ actions. Secondly, we describe 
the conceptual framework, expanding on microsituational and contextual variables, 
and the methods to study their impact on farmers’ actions. Thirdly, we present the 
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regression models explaining change in livestock endowment, appropriation, and 
provision. Furthermore, we present the results from Q methodology, which show the 
impact of contextual variables on the sustainable use of common property pastures. 
Finally, we discuss the implications of the study for policy makers and further research.
2. The case study region
Grindelwald is a Swiss municipality in the canton of Bern covering 171 km2, located 
in the heart of the European Alps (46° 37′ 32.98″ N, 8° 2′ 0.02″ E). With seven 
corporations self-governing the use of common property pastures, Grindelwald 
offers a natural lab-like setting for the study of appropriation and provision 
behaviour analogous to common pool and public good experiments (Table 1). Due 
to its natural beauty and snow sport facilities, Grindelwald is an internationally 
known tourism resort that attracts visitors all year round. Consequently, tourism is 
the most important source of income and offers diverse employment opportunities. 
Unlike other rural regions, the local population remains stable with about 3800 
inhabitants. Besides tourism, agriculture, in particular dairy farming, manages to 
coexist with tourism, even if the number of farmers is steadily diminishing as a 
result of structural changes in the agricultural sector towards fewer, but larger sized 
farms. Since 1980, the number of farmers in Grindelwald has roughly halved from 
242 to 123 in 2010. As a consequence, the average farm size has nearly doubled 
in terms of livestock and land holdings from about 5–6 to nearly 12 livestock 
units and hectares per household. Correspondingly, land use intensity on private 
grounds has been relatively stable in terms of livestock units per hectare, but has 
been significantly intensified in terms of cuts per year.
In addition to private land holdings, common property pastures provide an 
important source of animal feed. In the summer months, when farmers produce 
hay on their private lands for wintertime, the livestock grazes on common property 
pastures, looked after by herdsmen that produce artisan cheese from the milk. The 
herdsman is either the owner of the alp’s huts himself or a seasonal employee. 
The fees farmers pay to the corporation for the care of the animals provides the 
Table 1: Institutions for regulating appropriation and provision activities (Units in brackets; 
NST = a summered livestock unit).
Corporation
Units
 Maximum 
sustainable yield 
(NST)
 Provision 
requirements 
(hours/NST)
 Penalty for defection 
on provision
(CHF/ hour)
 Reimbursement of 
extra hours of provision
(CHF/hour)
Grindel  251   8  25  22
Scheidegg  234   8  24  20
Wärgistal  167   8  25  25
Itramen  217   8  30  29
Bussalp  256  10  25  20
Bach  149   8  25  22
Holzmatten   74   8  25  25
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herdsman’s income. At the end of the season, the cheese stock is redistributed to 
the cattle owner according to the cows’ milk yield.
2.1. Property arrangements
As Figure 1 shows, the productive area of Grindelwald is divided between 7 
corporations (“Bergschaft”). The corporations separate their land into private 
property in the valley (inside the red dotted line) and common property in higher 
altitude regions (outside the red dotted line). The small corporation “Holzmatten” 
is a special case as its private lands are cut off from the common property. The large 
uninhabitable area to the southeast is the only municipal territory not assigned to a 
corporation, but instead is under the sovereignty of the canton of Bern.
2.2. Institutional arrangements
The corporations enforce institutions to regulate appropriation and provision 
activities. Ownership and leasehold of private land allows for appropriation of 
common property pastures (Naegeli-Oertle 1986; Mordasini and Tiefenbach 
2006). All sections of land in the valley have rights attached to them that allow 
for appropriation in the corresponding corporation. Therefore, the location and the 
number of private plots formally restrict a farmer’s appropriation activities. Since 
rights can be leased among locals at reasonable rates, appropriation is not restricted 
for locals, neither by the amount of rights nor by the exact location of private plots. 
Figure 1: The case study region with the seven corporations (Source: Swisstopo).
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In return for the benefits obtained from appropriation, farmers must carry 
out provision activities or face fines. Provision activities consist of tasks such as 
the cleaning of pastures from bush, shrubs and stones, the installation of fences 
and drinking troughs, the distribution of manure, and the maintenance of storage 
facilities (Mordasini and Tiefenbach 2006). As indicated in Table 1, corporations 
schedule the hours of provision activities required per appropriated unit, set out 
penalties for defection and reimburse for additional provision efforts if the budget 
allows for. Each corporation elects a monitor who sanctions defection on provision 
activities and organises additional provision activities. If defectors fail to settle fines 
within a year, they lose the right to appropriate from the common property pasture. 
The maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is governed by agricultural policy 
through summering payments. The federal government subsidises each appropriated 
unit with CHF 320 per year, paid to the corporation. The subsidy must be reinvested 
to maintain the resource system and is incrementally reduced, if actual appropriation 
levels are above 10% or below 25% of the maximum sustainable yield as defined 
for the corporation. In Switzerland, the sustainable use of common property 
pastures is currently threatened by under- rather than by overgrazing which results 
in land abandonment and regrowth of forest and shrubs and consequently reduced 
bio- and landscape diversity. Summering payments therefore provide incentives for 
the corporation to keep grazing levels within a sustainable yield, including a lower 
and upper limit. The maximum sustainable yield is measured in appropriated units 
(NST). An appropriated unit corresponds to a livestock unit (GVE) summered for 
a hundred days. A livestock unit reflects an animal’s weight and nutritional needs. 
Accordingly, a dairy cow represents one unit, young cattle of 1–2 years 0.4 units, 
cattle up to 1 year 0.2 units, sheep 0.25 units, and goat 0.2 units. 
3. Methods
3.1. The Framework for analysing behaviour of common-pool resource users
This study uses the framework for analysing behaviour in commons dilemmas 
(Poteete et al. 2010). The framework build on the social-ecological systems 
framework proposed by Ostrom (2007, 2009), which compasses three levels 
of analysis: Firstly, the action situation with the users’ behaviour; secondly, the 
microsituation with the behavioural drivers; thirdly, the broader social-ecological 
context, where the latter affects the outcome of the microsituation. 
Figure 2 displays the framework focus on the action situation. Recent extensions 
of this framework highlight the adjacency of action situations (McGinnis 2011). As 
changes in livestock endowment determine potential appropriation and appropriation 
determines provision, the observed action situations are closely linked. The actions 
result in an overall intensity of use and maintenance of the common property pasture as 
the outcome. The microsituation refers to the users’ actions driven by personal attributes 
(U1...U10). The broader social-ecological context determines the microsituation 
and consists of the second tier variables, which describe a social-ecological system 
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(Ostrom 2007). Consequently, contextual variables include external settings (S), the 
resource system (RS), the governance system (GS), the resource units (RU), users’ 
attributes on the group (A) level, and social interactions (I) (Ostrom 2007; McGinnis 
2011). As user attributes describe both group (A) and individual characteristics (U), 
they are part of the microsituation as well as of the broader context as group attributes.
3.2. Analysis of the microsituation
In the microsituation, users’ attributes are the explanatory variables and the 
actions the dependent binary variables. Data was collected in a standardised 
survey carried out in the course of three weeks in summer 2011. Ninety-five 
questionnaires were collected from 125 registered local farmers, mostly at their 
home. The interviews lasted on average 105 minutes and were conducted in 
teams of two, with a graduate student leading the interview assisted by a bachelor 
student completing the questionnaire. We interviewed at least 50% of the farmers 
in each corporation. Only 6 of the interviewed farmers were female. 
The dependent variables were cross-checked for reliability with census data 
and against information collected from the monitors in order to ensure data quality. 
Livestock endowment was compared as nominal and as binary measure. The survey 
data for appropriation in absolute numbers were extrapolated to population size and 
then compared with the census data. The measures for provision behaviour were 
also extrapolated and compared with the information from a survey conducted 
with monitors of the corporations (n=7). The main purpose of this survey was 
to gather data on land use change published in another study. In this survey, the 
monitors had to state the number of defectors for 2010 in their corporation. For 
measuring change in livestock endowment we referred to a timespan of ten years 
Social, Economic, and Political Settings (S)
Contextual variables Resource system(RS)
Resource units
(RU)
Adjacent action situations
Livestock
endowment
Appropriation Provision Outcomes
Microsituation
Social interactions
(I)
Governance system
(GS)
Users
attributes
(U1...U10)
Us
er
 g
ro
up
 a
ttr
ib
u
te
s 
(A
)
Figure 2: Conceptual model for analysing behaviour in adjacent action situations. Adapted and 
modified after Poteete et al. (2010, 220–239).
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(2000–2010) as it is constrained by fixed factors. As appropriation and provision 
are seasonal decision, we referred to the behaviour in the past season (2010). 
3.2.1. Operationalization of explanatory variables
The explanatory variables consisted of second tier variables describing the users 
as proposed in the Social-Ecological Systems framework (Ostrom 2007, 2009; 
Poteete et al. 2010). Moreover, we added variable opportunity costs (U10) and 
operationalized the variables as follows:
U1-  Number of users referred to the number of farmers in the corporation. 
U2-  Socioeconomic attributes include 
 a) Age 
 b) Marital status
 c)  Successor: whether the farmer expected a family member to continue 
with the farm enterprise
 d) Area under cultivation
 e) Land use intensity for private plots
 f) Labour productivity of the farm enterprise 
U3-  History: a change in the farming strategy in the past ten years e.g. a switch 
in production standards or shift from dairy to mother cows. 
U4-  Location: geographic location of the farm. Since corporations with 
exposition North-East (Itramen, Wärgistal) are facing less demand for land 
from tourism, we expected agriculture to be more prosperous in that area. 
U5a-  Leadership referred to farmers holding a formal function within the 
corporation. 
U5b-  Entrepreneurship was measured as the pay-off per livestock unit resulting 
from the farmers’ appropriation behaviour (equation 1). 
 
pi
ω αi
i
i i i i i corp j
i
je
x c e x MSY x s x
x
= − + − − − ∑( ) ( ) ( )   (1)
Farmers pay-off (pi) per livestock unit (ei) depended on their appropriation behaviour. 
For each livestock unit, the farmer decided to either send it to common property 
pastures (xi), or have it graze on private land (ei–xi). Each appropriated unit (c) costs 
a fee of CHF 700 to compensate herdsman for the care and milking of the animal. 
The revenue of the appropriated unit (wi) is the farmer’s revenue from cheese sales. 
The revenue from grazing a livestock unit on private land (ai) equals the revenue 
of milk sales during the period. Since the corporation receives a subsidy (s) of CHF 
320 per appropriated unit, the difference between maximum sustainable yield of 
the corporation (MSY
corp) and the actual appropriation levels in the corporation (xj) 
results in foregone subsidies. We considered the forgone subsidies as costs that a 
farmer bears according to his share of the total appropriation in the corporation. 
(xi /∑xj).
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U6a-  Norms measured the farmer’s aversion against defection on communal 
work of joint-users.
U6b-  Social capital measured the amount of voluntary labour available to the 
farmer. This included family and friends who do not live in the same 
household.
U7-  Mental model referred to the identity of the individual regarding his 
profession. That is, whether the person considered his job title “Farmer” 
or not.
U8-  Importance of resource reflected the household’s dependence on 
agricultural income. 
U9-  Technology used referred to the production standard. Integrated 
production (IP-SUISSE) is the dominant production standard in the region 
and refers to a set of production requirements stricter than conventional, 
but more lenient than for organic farming. 
U10-  Opportunity costs measured the farmer’s relinquished benefit from off-
farm income when doing agricultural work (equation 2).
 
Opportunity cost
LA
LO
IO
IA
i
i
i
i
 = *
  
(2)
Whereas (LAi) is the household’s work hours allocated to agricultural activities 
divided by hours spent doing off-farm activities (LOi), multiplied by the off-farm 
income (IOi) over the agricultural income (IAi).
3.2.2. Statistical procedure 
We calculated binary logistic regression models to predict growth in livestock 
endowment, appropriation and provision behaviour based on the users’ attributes. 
Binary logistic regression calculates the log of the odds for a dichotomous 
dependent variable by maximum likelihood (ML) estimation (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 2000; Menard 2001) (equation 3): 
 
Logit (Y)=
−



= + + + +ln
P
P
X X Xk k1 0 1 1 2 2
β β β β…
 
(3)
Where: 
P is the probability of the outcome for Y=1 (i.., growth in livestock endowment, 
full appropriation and provision)
b0 is the constant in the model
X1…Xk represent the explanatory variables 
b1…bk represent the coefficients for the respective explanatory variables
To estimate the parameters of the model, we first calculated full models including 
all explanatory variables. As we had solely 89 data points for the variable labour 
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productivity (A2e) and 84 data points for the variable opportunity costs (A10), we 
omitted the two variables if not of significant explanatory power when calculating 
the reduced models. Thirdly, we estimated the parameters for the reduced 
models by maximum likelihood. The reduced models were selected by Bayesian 
Information criterion (BIC). Test statistics included for all models a non-significant 
Pearson Chi-squared, and significant Chi-squared tests. Lastly, we calculated 
standardised beta weights based on the mean of the predicted probability and the 
standard deviation of x1…xk (King 2007). The standardised beta transformed the 
coefficients into “standard deviation units” that allowed for scale-free comparison 
of binary and nominal variables (Menard 2004). The analysis was performed with 
the software package SPSS, Version 20.
3.3. Analysis of the broader contextual variables
We then applied a Q method approach to analyse the impact of contextual variables 
on the ecological, economic, and social sustainability of the social-ecological 
system. Originating in psychology, this method has been applied to a variety of 
social-ecological problems aiming to develop detailed portraits about people’s 
perspectives on a given problem (Swaffield and Fairweather 1996; Paula 2006; 
Swedeen 2006; Doody et al. 2009). As the local farmers were deemed to have 
the best knowledge about the way contextual variables affect the use of common 
property pastures, Q methodology was chosen to extract that knowledge by means 
of a five-step procedure.
i. Problem definition: Based on literature review and explorative 
interviews, we identified 34contextual variables that potentially 
affect the use of common property pastures. We identified 9 variables 
describing the external setting (S), 10 variables for the local governance 
system (GS), 3 for the resource system, 2 for the resource units (RU), 
5 for interactions (I), and another 5 describing the group attributes of 
the users (A). 
ii. Formulation of statements and definition of the sorting scheme: We used 
contextual variables instead of normative statements and decided that 
farmers should group the variables on a scale according to their perceived 
impact on the sustainable use of common property pastures. The scale 
ranged from +4 to −4, with the most positive impact at +4 and the least 
positive impact at −4 (Table 2).
iii. Selection of subjects: For our purpose, sampling included the people best 
informed and most affected by the problem under concern (Rajé 2007). 
Thus, we selected the seven monitors and four additional farmers for 
participation. 
iv. The sorting procedure (Q sorting): Before sorting, we asked farmers to 
divide statements into three piles according to their impact on the use 
of common property pastures; one with variables considered to have a 
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positive impact, one with variables considered to have a negative impact, 
and one with neutral variables. We simply asked farmers to evaluate 
whether the variables have a positive or negative or neutral impact on 
the use of common property pastures instead of mentioning sustainability. 
This pre-sorting mostly resulted in unequally distributed piles. Farmers 
then had to rank the statements on the scheme (Q sorting). During sorting, 
we asked farmers to comment on the reasoning for the placement which 
was recorded. At the end of sorting, farmers were given the opportunity to 
reflect on their choices and to reallocate variables. In order to qualitatively 
understand the impact of the variables on the different sustainability 
dimensions and on the functioning of the overall social-ecological system, 
we finally discussed sorting with the farmers. We then photographed the 
Q sorts and computed them later on.
v. Factor analysis and interpretation of results: We analysed the collected 
samples using the standard PQ Method software, Version 2.31. We 
calculated the mean z-scores for each statement and the corresponding 
rank to represent the aggregate view. Additionally we conducted a 
principal component analysis that generated 8 factors of which 4 had an 
Eigenvalue bigger than 1. As all subjects loaded significantly on one of the 
two factors with the highest Eigenvalues, we considered these two factors 
for Varimax rotation, which finally displayed the two most contrasting 
views (Fairweather and Swaffield 2001; Paula 2006).
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics of the microsituation
Table 3 presents the measures for the dependent variables by corporation. Farmers 
with increasing livestock endowment outweighed farmers with decreasing 
endowment. The majority of farmers appropriated their entire endowment. Among 
the farmers with reduced appropriation strategy, nine farmers didn’t appropriate at 
all and were therefore exempt from provision duties. The 86 farmers with provision 
duties showed strong tendencies towards full accomplishment of provision. On 
an aggregate level, all corporations achieved sustainable appropriation levels in 
terms of compliance with the range of state defined sustainable yields (75%−110% 
of optimal yield). The most intensive appropriation levels were observed in the 
Table 2: Q sorting scheme.
Q sorting scheme  Least positive impact   Most positive impact
Statement ranking  −4  −3  −2 −1 0  1  2  3  4
Number of statements 2  3  4   5 6  5  4  3  2
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corporation Scheidegg with 107% of maximum sustainable yield and lowest for 
Bach with 82% of maximum sustainable yield. Since no corporation showed 
a serious amount of defectors, overall provision activities are very close to the 
institutionally determined maximum. Therefore, both actions can be considered 
ecologically sustainable.
As indicated by the Cronbach’s-α, survey data show very good to satisfying 
reliability for dependent variables if compared with census or respectively 
monitors information. Livestock endowment ideally matches census data 
if coded as binary. However, our sample shows a nominal increase in total 
livestock endowment by 9%, while the census shows a reduction of 8% from 
2000 to 2010. Therefore, farmers with growing livestock endowment are slightly 
over-represented in the sample. The comparison of appropriation data with the 
census also shows good reliability with Cronbach’s-α at 0.874. The provision 
data shows lower reliability with Cronbach’s-α at 0.723, as monitors indicated 
15 defectors, whilst our sample included six. The reason for the deviation is 
that our sample includes local farmers only while the monitors also referred to 
8–10 external farmers, which, according to monitors, are more likely to defect 
on provision activities. 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for farmers’ attributes considered in 
the regression models. Farmers were on average 51.6 years old (U2a) with a mean 
cultivated area (U2c) of nearly 12 hectares. Typically, farmers held one livestock 
unit per hectare (U2d). According to the farm size index (SAK), a farm of this 
size can be managed by one person. The mean value for labour productivity 
(U2e) indicates that it took in fact two persons to run the farm, including the 
work of partners and voluntary labourers. With regard to family structure, 
most farmers were married (U2b) and often counted on voluntary labour (U6b) 
provided by their own children, grandparents, or neighbours but rarely expected 
family succession (U2f). Importance of resource (U8) shows that most farming 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for dependent variables listed per corporation.
Corporation  Livestock endowment  Appropriation  Provision
Reduced Growing Reduced Full Reduced Full
Grindel   3   9   3   9  2   9
Scheidegg   7   8   7   8  2  12
Wärgistal   3   7   2   8  0   9
Itramen   7  11  10   8  0  18
Bussalp   9  12  10  11  1  19
Bach   6   4   3   7  1   8
Holzmatten   8   1   4   5  0   5
Total
(%)
 43
(45%)
 52
(55%)
 39
(41%)
 56
(59%)
 6
(7%)
 80
(93%)
Cronbachs-a 0.958  0.874  0.723
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households substantially relied on off-farm income and no household relied 
solely on agricultural income. With regard to their pay-off (U5b), farmers differed 
widely, as the function allows for negative values. Farmers that appropriated 
non-milked animals or used a substantial amount of the cheese for their own 
consumption did not cover the costs of their appropriation decisions. The variable 
importance of resources shows that farmers in the region have good off-farm 
income opportunities. On average, their earnings per hour off-farm work triple 
the earnings from agricultural work. The sample also includes 11 retired farmers 
that have no opportunity costs (U10) for farming activities.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables.
Farmers’ attributes Description  N Mean SD
U1- Number of 
users
Number of farmers in the corporation to which the 
farmer belongs
 94 21.45 4.73
U2- Socioeconomic 
attributes of users
a) Age of farmer – Nominal (years)  95 51.62 12.28
b) Marital status – Binary variable. Value 1 if farmer 
is married
 95 0.75 0.44
c) Area under cultivation – Nominal (ha)  94 11.93 7.84
d) Land use intensity for private plots – Nominal 
(GVE/ha)
 95 0.98 0.37
e) Labour productivity – Effective working hours / 
work time needed according to farm size index 
(SAK)
 89 0.5 0.29
f) Successor – Binary variable. Value 1 if farmer 
thinks that there will be a successor in the family 
willing to continue with the farm business.
 95 0.27 0.45
U3- History of use History – Binary variable. Value 1 if farmer has changed 
the farming strategy within past 10 years.
95 0.67 0.47
U4- Location Location – Binary variable. Value 1 if the farmer is 
located exposition North-East.
 94 0.31 0.46
U5- Leadership/ 
entrepreneurship
a) Leadership – Binary Variable. Value 1 if the farmer 
has a formal function within the corporation
 95 0.32 0.47
b) Pay-off per GVE during summering season – 
Nominal variable (CHF)
 94 149.1 533.6
U6a- Norms Norms – Binary variable. Value 1 if the farmer dislikes 
other farmers avoiding communal work and paying 
fines instead.
 94 0.45 0.5
U6b- Social capital Social capital – Percentage of voluntary labour available 
to the farmer when needed (excluding their partners).
95 64.16 56.43
U7- Mental models Mental model – Binary variable. Value one if the farmer 
considers his job title to be “Farmer”.
 94 0.64 0.48
U8- Importance of 
resource
Importance of resource – Share of agricultural income 
in proportion to total household income 
 95 36.78 29.46
U9- Technology 
used
Technology – Binary variable. Value 1 if the farmer 
produces according to IP standards.
 95 0.68 0.47
U10- Opportunity 
costs
Opportunity costs – Share of agricultural working hours 
in relation to total working hours divided by the share of 
agricultural income in proportion to total income.
 84 2.92 3.26
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4.2. Regression model for change in livestock endowment
Table 5 lists variables significantly associated with change in livestock endowment. 
Considering the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), the model with 4 variables 
offers the best fit to the data in relation to the variables included. The b-values 
reveal positive effects for marital status (U2b) and area (U2c), and negative effects 
for age (U2a) and norms (U6a) on the odds of increasing livestock endowment. 
The standardised β-values display the actual effect of the variables in the model, 
irrespective of scale. 
As indicated by the standardised b, area is the strongest predictor for change in 
livestock endowment. With every additional hectare of cultivated area (U2c), the 
odds for livestock growth increased by 17.5%. This suggests that size conditions 
growth and those farmers with larger sized farms are more likely to attempt to 
realise economies of scale than colleagues with smaller landholdings.
Age proved to be the second best predictor for change in livestock endowment, 
as an additional year of life reduced the odds for livestock growth by 7.8%. This 
relationship might be partly linked to farmers’ fitness and partly to policies. As 
age (U2a) is negatively correlated with labour productivity (U2e), decreasing 
physical abilities possibly forced some farmers’ to reduce livestock endowment. 
Additionally, farmers receive substantial direct payments until retirement age. 
This suggests that farmers’ willingness to invest in factors constraining livestock 
endowment such as barn capacity or land decreases as they approach retirement 
age. The main reason might be that without direct payments, such investments are 
likely to become untenable.
Table 5: Estimated and standardised b-coefficients for binary logistic regression models 
predicting change in livestock endowment. Standard errors (se) in brackets and significance 
levels p are indicated by asterisk (99%***, 95%**, 90%*).
Explanatory
Variable
 β
(se)
 βs
U2a- Age  −0.081  −0.230***
 (0.026)  
U2b- Marital status 1.602  0.163**
 (0.645)  
U2c- Area  0.161  0.288***
 (0.048)  
U6a- Norms  −1.354  −0.158**
 (0.576) 
Constant  2.358  
 (1.339) 
N  94  
Pseudo R2 (NK)  0.514  
−2LL  82.6  
BIC  105.2  
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Growth in livestock endowment was also associated with marital status 
(U2b). For married farmers, the odds for endowment growth increased 4 times. 
This suggests that partnership facilitates dealing with the extra workload resulting 
from additional livestock. Rather surprisingly, norms (U6a) which display 
positive attitude towards the fulfilment of provision activities decreased the odds 
for endowment growth by a factor of 0.24. This suggests that with growth in 
endowment, the concern for the maintenance of common property decreases. 
4.3. Regression model for appropriation behaviour
Table 6 presents the variables significantly associated with appropriation 
behaviour. The b-values show a positive association of marital status (U2b) and 
norms (U6a) and negative association of area (U2c) and leadership (U5a) with 
full appropriation. As displayed by the standardised beta weights, norms (U6a) 
are the best predictor for appropriation behaviour followed by leadership (U5a), 
marital status (U2b), and area (U2c).
We found the strongest association to be between norms (U6a) and 
appropriation behaviour. Hence, farmers with aversion against defection on 
communal work had 2.4 times higher odds for appropriating all their livestock 
which points to self-interest. A farmer appropriating all his livestock is likely 
to be more concerned about the state of the resource and therefore also cares 
about joint-users fulfilling their provision activities. Leadership attributes (U5a) 
assigned to farmers with formal function in a corporation reduced the odds 
for full appropriation by a factor of 0.38. As farmers communicated, reduced 
Table 6: Estimated and standardised b-coefficients for binary logistic regression models 
predicting appropriation. Standard error (se) in brackets, significance levels indicated by 
asterisk (99%***, 95%**, 90%*)
Explanatory
Variable
 β
(se)
 βs
U2b- Marital status  0.916  0.096*
 (0.522)  
U2c- Area  −0.038  −0.073*
 (0.032)  
U5a- Leadership  −0.945  −0.106*
 (0.524)  
U6a- Norms  1.253  0.150***
 (0.484) 
Constant  −0.045  
 (0.599) 
N  93  
Pseudo R2 (NK)  0.220  
−2LL  109.0  
BIC  131.6  
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Table 7: Estimated and standardised b-coefficients for binary logistic regression models 
predicting provision behaviour. Standard error (se) in brackets, significance levels indicated by 
asterisk (99%***, 95%**, 90%*)
Explanatory
Variable
 β
(se)
 βs
A2c- Area  −0.213  −0.127**
 (0.116)  
A5b-Pay-off  0.003  0.108**
 (0.001)  
A8-Importance of resource 0.048  0.103*
 (0.027)  
Constant  3.734  
 (1.223) 
N  86  
Pseudo R2 (NK)  0.248  
−2LL  34.6  
BIC  52.4  
appropriation lessens workload. In this case, mostly younger cattle are kept in 
the valley to graze unproductive pastures for which mowing is labour intensive. 
Possible explanations would therefore be that leaders cultivated more marginal 
pastures or tended to have younger animals.
Socio-economic attributes such as marital status (U2b) and area (U2c) were also 
significantly associated with appropriation behaviour. Married farmers were 1.5 
times more likely to appropriate their full endowment, while an additional hectare 
of area leads to a decrease in the odds of full appropriation by 3.7%. The reasoning 
for both variables again might point to the role of workload. When hay collection 
and provision duties can be split among couples during peak times, appropriation 
behaviour of married farmers might be less determined by labour scarcity. The 
need to reduce workload might also increase with area (U2c), leading farmers with 
larger land holdings to reduce appropriation and concentrate on private lands.
4.4. Regression model for provision behaviour
Table 7 displays the reduced model for provision behaviour. The models entail 
fewer cases, as farmers without appropriation were exempt from provision 
activities. The uneven distribution of the dependent variable explains larger 
standard errors. Stepwise reduction points to area (U2c), followed by pay-off 
(A5b), and importance of resource (A8) as the most important predictors. 
The strongest association existed between area (U2c) and provision behaviour. 
That is an increase in land holding by an additional hectare reduced the odds 
of full provision by 19.2%. The negative effect of land holding on provision 
suggests that extra workload resulting from additional plots prevents farmers 
from accomplishing their provision duties. Regarding the beta coefficient, an 
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additional Swiss franc in pay-off (U5b) increased the odds of full provision by 
0.3%. Although this seems negligible, the standardised coefficient illustrates that 
with a coarser scale, the effect would have become more pronounced. Moreover, 
importance of resource shows that an increase in agricultural income of 1% 
compared to non-agricultural income, increased the odds of full provision by 
4.9%. The positive association of pay-off (U5b) and importance of resource (A8) 
with full provision suggests a strong positive relationship between the benefits 
obtained from a resource and farmers’ willingness to maintain it. 
4.5. The impact of contextual variables on the sustainable use of common 
property pastures
Table 8 shows the impact of contextual variables on the sustainable use of 
common property pastures in terms of ecological, economic, and social outcomes. 
The Mean value represents the overall sample, while Factor A and B represent 
the most distinguishing views. According to the overall sample, sustainability is 
promoted in particular through the functioning of the subsystems resource units 
(RU) and to a lesser extent by group attributes (A). The subsystem challenging 
sustainability includes the external settings (S), the resource system (RS), and 
interactions (I). The role of the governance system (GS) is neutral. 
The mean value for the external settings reflects discontent with agricultural 
policies. Both government resource polices (S5) and market incentives (S6) 
achieve negative scores. The most problematic issues include dependence on direct 
payments, regulations for obtaining them and the milk price. In summary, farmers 
see government support and the relevant regulations as threatening entrepreneurial 
freedom and would instead appreciate stronger market incentives. Among 
government policies, only summering payments contribute to sustainability and 
provide financial resources to the corporation for the maintenance of the resource 
system. The mean value for income opportunities in the tourism sector shows the 
importance of off-farm income for farmers’ livelihoods. Accordingly, tourism 
rather enables than competes with farming, even though in the resource system 
(RS) increasing demand for building sites, reduces available productive agricultural 
land. Within the governance system (GS), the local constitutional rules (GS7) are 
considered to have a positive impact, including the recent opening of common 
property pastures to non-local users. Thus, the presence of foreign cattle is not 
a desired development, but a necessary response to decreasing local livestock. 
Furthermore, the agricultural sector faces decreasing standing in municipal politics.
Resource units (RU) achieve the highest scores, as their economic value (RU4) 
provides incentives for the use of common property pastures. Particularly the 
added value in the production of alpine cheese compared to milk sales motivates 
appropriation. The main reason for the high added value of alpine cheese is 
sales opportunities resulting from the demand strengthened by the local tourism 
sector. Besides high scores for the resource units, users’ group attributes (A) also 
achieved a slightly positive score. Surprisingly, interviewees consider the group 
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Table 8: Normalised factor scores for contextual variables on ordinal scale ranging from +4 
indicating the most positive impact to −4 indicating the least positive impact of the variables on 
the sustainable use of common property pasture. The Mean values refer to the overall sample, 
while Factors A and B display the most distinguishing views. Asterisks mark the variables 
distinguishing Factors at a significance of 99%. Values for subsystems and second tier variables 
are calculated by means of the referring statements.
Contextual variables Normalised scores
Mean Factor A Factor B
External Settings (S) −0.7 −0.7 −0.1
S5- Government resource policies −0.7 −0.2 0
Dependence on agricultural income* −1 −3 4
Direct payments tied to livestock* −1 2 −2
Direct payments tied to private land* 0 0 3
Ecological regulations for obtaining direct payments* −3 0 −4
Rules for the obtainment of summering payments* −1 −3 1
Summering payments* 2 3 −2
S6- Market incentives −0.7 −1.7 −0.3
Off-farm income opportunities in the local tourism sector 4 3 2
Dependence upon direct payments* −4 −4 0
Milk price −2 −4 −3
Resource System (RS) −0.3 −0.7 −0.7
RS3- Size of resource system −0.5 −1 −1.5
Availability of agricultural area in the valley −2 −1 −2
Area of the corporation 1 −1 −1
RS5- Productivity of system
Quality of common property pastures 0 0 1
Governance System (GS) 0 0.3 0.4
GS3- Network structure −0.7 1 1.3
Recognition of agriculture by local politics −3 −1 −1
Reimbursements of railway operators to the corporations 0 2 2
Solidarity between the corporations 1 2 3
GS4- Property rights system −0.7 −0.3 −0.7
Flexibility and lease of use rights* 0 −2 1
Amount of use rights in relation to the stock of animals present in the valley −2 1 0
Attachment of use rights to private parcels in the valley* 0 0 −3
GS5- Operational rules 0.3 −0.3 −0.7
Hours of communal work to be conducted 2 1 1
Opening of the common property pastures for foreign cattle* 3 0 −2
Presence of foreign cattle on the common property pastures −4 −2 −1
GS7- Constitutional rules
Rules of the local constitution* 3 2 4
Resource Units (RU) 3.5 4 1
RU4- Economic value 3.5 4 1
Added value of alpine cheese* 4 4 2
Marketing and sales opportunities* 3 4 0
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Contextual variables Normalised scores
Mean Factor A Factor B
Group attributes of Users (A) 0.4 0.4 −1.2
A1- Number of users 1 1 −1
Number of farmers* 2 1 −1
Share of locally born and raised farmers* −1 0 −1
A5- Leadership/entrepreneurship 1 2 0
Farmers innovative abilities and entrepreneurship 1 1 0
Leadership within the corporation 1 3 0
A7- Knowledge of SES
Know-how of the employees on the Alp* −1 −3 −1
Interactions (I) −0.4 −1 0.6
I3- Deliberation process 0 −2 0
Common values and goals for administering corporations*
I4- Conflicts among user −2 −2 3
Negotiability of conflicts on the local level*
I5- Investment activities 1.5 0 1.5
The amount of resources invested into the infrastructure 2 1 2
Willingness to fulfil provision requirements* 1 −1 1
I7- Self-organizing activities
Cohesion and solidarity among the farmers* −3 −1 −3
Table 8:  Continued
of farmers to be large enough, although the number of farmers (A1) is constantly 
decreasing. Interactions (I) were valued slightly negatively. Farmers complained 
of solidarity among themselves (I3), negotiability of conflicts (I4), cohesion (I7), 
and, while infrastructural investments (I5) and willingness to fulfil provision 
activities achieved positive scores.
4.5.1. Disagreement regarding the impact of contextual variables
As indicated by Factors A and B in Table 8, we identified two groups of farmers with 
different perceptions regarding the role of contextual factors for the sustainable use 
of common property pastures. Factor A represents a liberal market-oriented view 
and Factor B represents a traditional view. Their views differ mostly with regard 
to the functioning of the government’s resource policies (S5) and interactions (I). 
The liberal viewpoint is closer to the overall sample with an Eigenvalue of 2.89 
and seven people loading on it. The traditionalist view achieves an Eigenvalue of 
2 with four people loading on it. 
The liberal viewpoint displays preferences for market incentives (S6) resulting 
from interrelations with tourism accompanied by scepticism against agricultural 
policies. Accordingly, the tourism sector supports local demand for alpine products 
and off-farm income opportunities to reduce dependence on agricultural income and 
direct payments. Overall, the liberal viewpoint claims that an external setting (S), 
which offers more room for market forces and entrepreneurial freedom enhances 
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the sustainable use of common property pastures. The estimation of the economic 
value of resource units (RS) as incentives for the sustainable use of common 
property pastures underlines the market-oriented perspective. According to their 
perception, higher returns for alpine products determines farmers’ willingness to 
use and maintain the Alps sustainably and was considered the best means to prevent 
land abandonment. In contrast, increasing governmental regulations cause higher 
transaction costs with governmental agencies, for example through controls, and 
furthermore requires unproductive investments to meet the prescribed standards, 
which are often considered bureaucratic burdens that interfere with sustainable 
traditional practices. In accordance with preferences for market incentives, the 
liberals show less concern over the presence of foreign cattle, but more concern 
over interactions (I) among farmers. Particularly common values (I3) and goals in 
negotiating affairs in the corporations and the negotiability of conflicts (I4) on the 
local level achieve negative scores. Such conflicts arise mostly over the organisation 
of sales activities or the management of the resource system in co-existence with 
tourism. The latter includes questions such as whether to allow tourist infrastructure 
such as ponds, artificial snow production or new trails and restaurants.
In contrast to the liberal view, the traditional view shows preferences for a 
closed agricultural system and livelihood focused on income from agriculture. The 
traditionalist viewpoint considers a dependence on agricultural income and direct 
payments tied to private plots to foster the sustainable use of common property 
pastures. Although the traditionalists are critical about the regulations for obtaining 
direct payments, they acknowledge that government support secures agricultural 
livelihoods. According to the traditional view, an external setting (S) that relies 
on heavy government support, enables agricultural livelihoods and thus promotes 
the sustainable use of common property pastures. Furthermore, traditionalists 
prefer a closed self-organised system as represented by the strong positive value of 
constitutional rules (GS7) and the possibility of leasing use rights among farmers. 
In terms of opening the system, traditionalists are concerned about the presence of 
foreign cattle and the number of farmers and their origin. They are concerned that 
the opening of the system might endanger the local cohesion and self-organisation. 
5. Discussion
The behaviour of individuals in social dilemmas is a central puzzle in the study of 
the commons (Poteete et al. 2010; Anderies et al. 2011). Since information about 
behavioural drivers derives mostly from experimental research, this study aims 
to complement experimental findings with field observations from Grindelwald, 
Switzerland. In doing so, we estimated regression models from survey data to 
predict the behaviour of alpine farmers regarding change in livestock endowment, 
appropriation, and provision. Data showed that a slight majority of farmers (55%) 
increased endowment and applied full appropriation strategy (59%). Completion 
of provision activities was remarkably high (93%). 
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As summarised in Table 9, behaviour depended significantly on diverse user 
attributes. Socio-economic attributes, in particular age (U2a), marital status 
(U2b), and area (U2c), explained farmers’ changes in livestock endowment. The 
role of age and marital status is best explained by their effect on work organisation, 
as youth and partnership allow the handling of larger endowments. Furthermore, 
the variable area suggests that farm size itself is the strongest predictor for 
endowment growth. The key role of area and also age in determining farm 
development is widely confirmed in the literature and indicates structural change 
towards fewer but larger sized farms (Baur 1999; Weiss 1999; Lauber et al. 
2008). Other variables found to be associated with farm development such as 
presence of a successor (Potter and Lobley 1996; Mann 2003), opportunity costs, 
and labour productivity (Schmitt 1992), did not have a significant effect upon 
livestock endowment in the study region. Furthermore, the negative association 
of area with appropriation and particularly with provision behaviour suggests 
that farmers with larger sized farms concentrate labour on private property and 
reduce the use of common property. Likewise, farmers with larger land holdings 
are more likely to defect. As discussed, reduced appropriation reduces workload 
in two ways. Firstly, marginal private pastures are grazed by animals instead 
of labour intensive hay production. Secondly, lower appropriation reduces 
provision requirements.
Appropriation behaviour showed the strongest association with norms 
(U6a) – measured as farmers’ aversion against defection on provision, assuming 
individuals with a full appropriation strategy are more concerned about the 
Table 9: Direction of significant effects of individuals attributes on behavior in social dilemmas 
as calculated by binary logistic regression (99%***, 95%**, 90%*). Additionally, the effects 
of contextual variables on the sustainable use of common property pastures as calculated 
by Q Method are indicated by arrows (moderate negative; neutral; moderate positive; 
positive)
Method
Variables
 
 
Regression Models  
 
Q Method
Livestock endowment  Appropriation  Provision Outcomes
U2a- Age  (−)***    
U2b- Marital status  (+)**  (+)*   
U2c- Area  (+)***  (−)*  (−)**  
U5a- Leadership   (−)*   
U5b- Pay-off    (+)**  
U6a- Norms  (−)**  (+)***   
U8- Importance of resource    (+)*  
S- External setting     
RS- Resource system     
GS- Governance system      
RU- Resource units      
A- Group attributes of users     
I- Interactions     
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productivity of the resource and consequently hold stronger norms towards 
provision fulfilment. Self-interest might equally explain the association of pay-
off (U5b) and the importance of resource with full provision behaviour. Hence, 
the willingness of individuals to maintain a common-pool resource increases the 
more an individual relies on the resource for his livelihood and the higher the 
generated pay-offs. 
To assess the impact of contextual variables on the sustainable use of common 
property pastures, we applied Q methodology. Among the contextual variables, 
the value of resource units (RU4) was considered to have the most positive impact 
on the sustainability of common property pastures. As the economic value affects 
an individual’s pay-off ability, we have reason to assume that a close positive 
relationship exists between the value of resource units and the fulfilment of 
provision activities. Tourism helps strengthening local demand and the economic 
value of resource units, and thus pay-offs. Furthermore, tourism allows for 
livelihoods with balanced agricultural and off-farm activities reducing the need to 
increase farm size, which is assumed to reduce use and maintenance of common 
property pastures. With regard to the perception of external settings (S), farmers 
differed significantly in their views. A liberalist viewpoint was identified that 
favours price incentives over governmental support, while the traditional view 
assumes that sustainability of common property pastures is promoted by strong 
governmental support securing agriculture-based livelihoods.
5.1. Implications for policy makers
The study provides further evidence that structural change towards fewer but 
larger sized farms results in decreasing use and maintenance of common property 
pastures (Gellrich et al. 2007). As average farm size increases, farmers reduce 
appropriation levels, resulting in an overall reduction of provision activities. 
Furthermore, the defection rate is likely to increase as farms grow bigger. To 
balance the reduced use resulting from structural change, we see three major policy 
options: (i) within the local governance system (GS), a further opening of the 
pastures and active acquisition of cattle from the lowlands; (ii) regarding external 
settings (S), stronger incentives for summering particularly of younger cattle; and 
(iii) policies for increasing the value of resource units. The further opening of 
pastures is likely to have some undesirable consequences. As the monitors stated, 
external users are more likely to defect on communal work and pay fines instead. 
This might lead to situations, where appropriators and maintenance providers 
become two separate groups, with external appropriators paying fees for defection 
on provision that might be used by the corporation to reimburse local farmers for 
provision. It is likely that both the quantity and quality of provision activities 
might then decrease as incentives, for provision are closely linked to appropriation 
levels. Furthermore, the Q method results for the governance system (GS) showed 
that farmers consider the presence of foreign cattle an undesirable, but necessary, 
as foreign cattle is less suitable to alpine conditions. Therefore, policies should 
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target incentives to foster the appropriation of local cattle with focus on younger 
cattle in particular, which are often left grazing in the valley. Furthermore, the 
maintenance of common property pastures depends on farmers’ pay-offs, which 
are determined by the economic value of resource units. As a consequence, 
marketing tools for alpine dairy products should be considered as a policy option. 
A clear communication of the non-industrial production process and of the added 
cultural and ecological values potentially secures demand and prices for alpine 
products which are crucial for the sustainable use of common property pastures.
5.2 Implications for the study of the commons
5.2.1. Variables associates with appropriation and provision behaviour
Ostrom identifies six user attributes (U1, U2, U5, U6, U7, U8) that are potentially 
important for the sustainability of social-ecological systems (Ostrom 2009; 
Poteete et al. 2010). Although these variables relate to successful self-organisation 
of groups, our study expands on how the variables promote sustainable 
interaction of users with the ecological system. Along the lines of the framework, 
entrepreneurial attributes (U5), norms (U6) and importance of resource (U8) 
were central behavioural drivers in our study that relate to Ostrom’s findings. 
According to Ostrom, presence of leaders and entrepreneurship in a group 
facilitates self-organisation; our study shows that entrepreneurship has a positive 
impact on fulfilment of provision duties, while leaders (defined as those who hold 
a formal function in a corporation) are more likely to apply reduced appropriating 
strategies. The latter is mostly context-specific, as leaders tend to be those with 
a long regional family tradition who own the ancient “Vorsassen” located on the 
border to common property; these private plots are generally less productive 
and difficult to mow and thus particularly suited for grazing younger animals. 
Furthermore, Ostrom shows that groups with shared moral and ethical norms 
face lower transaction costs for self-organisation. Our study reveals that with 
higher appropriation levels, users develop stronger norms for the maintenance 
of the resource which suggests that they show more commitment to leading self-
organising and monitoring activities. Furthermore, users depending on a resource 
for their livelihood are more willing to invest in the maintenance of the resource, 
which is shown in the provision model. In contrast to the Ostrom framework, the 
variables number of users (U1) and mental models (U7) had no significant impact 
in our case. This is probably due to the heterogeneous group size of corporations 
and the fact that the mental model, which measured the farmers’ identity, does 
not significantly affect farmers’ actions. We expected that individuals, who define 
farming as their main occupation, are more likely to run growing enterprises, 
show higher appropriation and provision levels, which proved not to be the 
case. Recent studies propose an understanding of mental models as the inner 
representation of the external world (Jones et al. 2011). Q-methodology is a valid 
tool to elaborate on individuals’ mental models. Unfortunately, our study design 
does not allow us to draw conclusions on how the perception of the functioning 
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of the social-ecological system (e.g. liberalist view) relates to actual behaviour. 
Nevertheless, mental models constitute a central part in the study of social-
ecological interactions that can be equally addressed in experimental research 
(Lynam et al. 2012). Similarly, the variable opportunity costs of farming (U10) 
that we added to the framework did not significantly affect behaviour. 
5.2.2. Implications for commonpool and public good experiments
The study provides implications for future experimental research exploring 
appropriation and provision problems. Most importantly, our findings suggest 
that appropriation and provision behaviour is closely linked through norms 
(U6a) and pay-offs (U5b). People with higher appropriation levels hold stronger 
norms regarding the provision fulfilment of joint users. Thus, we hypothesise 
that individuals with higher appropriation levels are more willing to invest in the 
monitoring and sanctioning of provision defectors in public good experiments. 
Experiments have shown that sanctioning possibilities increase corporation (Falk 
et al. 2002; Nikiforakis and Normann 2008), that individuals willingness to invest 
in sanctioning is best explained through inequality aversion (Fehr and Gächter 
2000) and that even externals who do not benefit from public good provision 
make substantial investment for punishing defectors (Fehr and Fischbacher 
2004). Nevertheless sanctioning has not been interpreted as an altruistic act 
to increase common welfare, but rather rooted in the desire to invoke costs 
on defectors (Bowles and Gintis 2002). Our results suggest that self-interest 
might be of central importance for sanctioning behaviour as those with highest 
appropriation rates hold the strongest norms regarding the corporation of joint 
users for the provision of public goods. Therefore, future experiments might test 
if individuals’ investment levels are indeed positively associated with higher 
willingness to punish defectors in public goods games. Furthermore, the study 
suggests that people with higher pay-offs from appropriation will make higher 
investments into the public good. This finding relates to public good experiments, 
where investments increase with marginal returns (Isaac and Walker 1988; Isaac 
et al. 1994; Janssen and Ostrom 2006) but is contrasted by a study showing that 
individuals with higher income contribute less (Chan et al. 1996). Therefore, 
future experiments might consider linking common-pool experiments with public 
good experiments to test, if individuals with higher appropriation pay-off make 
larger investments into the public good.
5.2.3. Methodological challenges in linking behaviour to context
As this study observed behaviour for a single period, longitudinal studies are 
needed to observe the behaviour repeatedly and relate it to actions of joint users. 
Such studies will allow the inclusion of variables such as reciprocity, which is 
considered crucial for behaviour in experimental studies (Rustagi et al. 2010; 
Gächter and Thöni 2011) and whether predicted patterns of strategies towards 
concentration of either full or cero contribution (Janssen and Ahn 2006) can be 
equally observed in the field. Furthermore, additional studies on individuals’ 
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behaviours are needed in the context of other common-pool resources to further 
theorise the interplay of microsituational and contextual variables and the way they 
determine behaviour. In our study, individuals are guided by robust institutions 
(Baur and Binder 2013). It might well be that our findings do not apply to a social-
ecological context, where incentive structures are entirely different, in particular 
in settings, where over-exploitation and under-provision are dominant modes of 
behaviour. Therefore, it remains a methodological challenge to control for the 
impact of contextual variables on behaviour. Q methodology was used in this 
study to elaborate on the role of different contextual variables and on the different 
dimensions of sustainability of the SES. Given the notion of Q methodology that 
the number of distinct viewpoints on a given topic is limited (Van Exel and de 
Graaf 2005), we decided to extract knowledge from the people best informed 
using a rather small sample. The sharp distinction between the two views that we 
found as confirmed by the individuals’ factor loadings increases confidence that 
the results from Q method best represent the farmers’ views. 
Unfortunately, the study design does not reveal how differences in the perception 
of contextual variables link to the observed behaviour on the individual level as 
this would require a larger sample of the q method to gather more data points for 
the individuals in order to make reliable predictions. Future studies adopting the 
same combination of methods would potentially benefit from including not only 
resource users, but also external experts on the topic from governmental, NGO 
or science for sampling. Experts might provide different perspectives that would 
allow distinguishing between farmers and experts opinions more clearly.
6. Conclusion
This study offers explanations about the way personal attributes affect 
individuals’ use of common-pool resources. It thus elaborates on the general 
framework of studying social-ecological systems and laboratory experiments, 
which simulate appropriation and provision problems. Our findings suggest that 
socio-economic attributes (U2) determine the endowment of resource users and 
provision activities. Norms (U6a) and pay-off (U5b) determined appropriation 
and provision behaviour. The analysis shows that individuals, who appropriate 
intensely, hold stronger norms towards maintaining the resource stock and as 
a result would be probably more willing to invest in the punishment of free-
riders. In turn, it was shown that the higher an individual’s economic benefit 
generated from appropriation, the less likely a user is to defect on externally 
assigned provision duties for maintaining the resource stock and the physical 
infrastructure. In summary, the study reveals that those individuals who use 
a resource intensively and benefit most from it also have the biggest interest 
in maintaining resource productivity in the long run, and thus apply and 
enforce pro-social behaviour. The analysis of contextual variables suggests 
that this mechanism is accelerated with increasing value of resource units for 
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the management of common property pastures. This raises two questions for 
experimental research that would require linking appropriation to provision 
situations: (i) Are individuals with higher appropriation rates also more willing 
to invest in the sanctioning of provision defectors in public good situations in 
order to sustain or increase their appropriation pay-offs? (ii) Does an increase in 
an individual’s pay-offs from appropriation result in higher investments into the 
public good? If so, self-interest can be indeed considered a motivational driver 
leading to pro-social behaviour. Nevertheless, behaviour remains context-specific, 
which limits the extent to which these findings can be generalised. Behaviour is 
thus likely to vary with factors such as the quality of institutions, the type, and 
prices of the resource used, and the overall condition of the social-ecological 
system; the control for contextual factors and their effect on the associations 
of personal attributes with behaviour in field studies and experimental research 
consequently remains a central methodological challenge for the study of the 
commons.
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